News / Price-setters or price-takers? How the box lines played the rate game in 2025

© Luo Yi |

MSC

MSC was the most aggressive strategic actor of the year, consistently prioritising market share over price discipline. It injected capacity when rivals hesitated, most visibly on the transatlantic, where its standalone Albatross and Dragon/MD4 round-the-world services sharply expanded supply even as rates weakened. On Asia-Europe, MSC was often first to publish ambitious FAK resets ($3,000–$4,750 per 40ft at various points), helping establish temporary floors ahead of tender season, but it was also widely seen discounting fastest when resistance emerged. By year-end, MSC’s playbook was clear: dominate network coverage, tolerate volatility, and accept that margin would be made in bursts rather than sustained cycles.

Maersk

Maersk’s year was defined by transition and caution. The shift into the Gemini Cooperation reshaped its Asia-Europe pricing posture, with Maersk frequently cited as offering some of the most competitive base rates to defend utilisation. It relied more on PSSs and selective GRIs than headline FAK shocks, especially from mid-year onward. On the transpacific, Maersk moved capacity tactically around tariff-driven demand spikes, but retreated quickly once volumes faded. Its share price sensitivity to Red Sea and Suez headlines underlined investor concern that Maersk’s lower-volatility, contract-led strategy leaves less upside in chaotic spot markets.

CMA CGM

CMA CGM played the role of rate architect, repeatedly attempting to reset market expectations with bold FAK announcements, particularly on Asia-Europe and Asia-Med. While not always successful, these moves often provided the reference points around which negotiations clustered. CMA CGM also leaned heavily on surcharge engineering (PSS, bunker recovery, seasonal add-ons) rather than pure spot escalation. Compared with MSC, it showed more restraint on capacity, but less than Maersk or Hapag-Lloyd, leaving it somewhere between volume defence and margin ambition.

Hapag-Lloyd

Hapag-Lloyd emerged as the discipline advocate, especially in the second half. It was the most explicit in framing ‘shock-and-awe’ GRIs (notably mid-October) as a response to unsustainable pricing, harking back to pre-Red Sea crisis playbooks. Within Gemini, however, it faced criticism for not blanking aggressively enough early on, contributing to sharper Asia-Europe rate erosion in late summer. By Q4, Hapag-Lloyd leaned hard into capacity withdrawal plus high FAK signalling to support 2026 contract talks, even if spot compliance was partial.

COSCO/OOCL (Ocean Alliance)

Ocean Alliance carriers had a structurally difficult year. Despite strong underlying volumes on Asia-Europe, they were frequently cited as most exposed to tonnage gaps and operational strain, particularly on Evergreen-operated strings. This weakened their ability to capitalise on tight capacity narratives. Commercially, Ocean Alliance lines were often price followers rather than setters, reacting to MSC and CMA CGM moves rather than leading them. Their challenge was less demand than execution and consistency, which eroded pricing power during the late-summer rate war phase.

ONE

ONE maintained a low-profile, defensive strategy, largely aligning with alliance pricing without pushing independent initiatives. It focused on protecting utilisation and service reliability rather than chasing spot volatility. As a result, it avoided the worst of the price wars but also missed opportunities during brief rate spikes. ONE’s year can be summed up as stability over ambition.

Zim

ZIM remained the purest spot-market proxy. It benefitted disproportionately from tariff-pause surges on the transpacific, then suffered equally sharp reversals when demand collapsed. ZIM’s exposure to short-term pricing meant it featured heavily in weeks of extreme volatility but had little ability to shape outcomes. By year-end, its position illustrated the risks of operating without deep contractual ballast in a market swinging between geopolitical shocks and structural overcapacity.

Evergreen

Evergreen’s year was operationally challenging. While demand supported its networks, particularly in Asia-Europe, vessel availability constraints limited its ability to fully staff services, undermining schedule integrity and rate leverage. Commercially, it tended to follow alliance pricing rather than dictate it, and was frequently referenced as being stretched rather than opportunistic during the late-summer rate war.