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2025 was not a story of collapse, but of failed control: carriers could still move rates in short bursts, but no longer dictate direction. Policy shocks, overcapacity and competition ensured that every rally was temporary, and every reset contested. 

January to March, Q1: Managed decline and “discipline theatre” 

The year opened with freight rates already under pressure from structural overcapacity and the post-holiday lull. Carriers responded with familiar tools; blank sailings, GRIs, and strong signalling around discipline – but market confidence was thin. 

Rates drifted lower rather than collapsing, largely because carriers were quick to cancel sailings and talk up capacity restraint, particularly on Asia-Europe. The transpacific softened steadily, while Europe-bound trades proved more resilient, helped by Red Sea diversions and congestion that absorbed tonnage. 

This was a period of optics over outcomes: pricing held better than fundamentals suggested, but few believed it would last without an external catalyst. 

April to June, Q2: Tariff-pause shock and the ‘phantom peak’ 

That catalyst arrived with the US tariff pause, triggering a sharp, sudden surge in transpacific demand as shippers rushed to front-load cargo. Spot rates spiked rapidly, particularly to the US west coast, and carriers rushed capacity back into the trade to monetise the rally. 

But the surge proved fleeting. By mid-June, demand fell away just as capacity peaked, and rates collapsed at speed, wiping out weeks of gains in a matter of days. The market had created a phantom peak: a policy-driven rally with no structural support. 

In contrast, Asia-Europe became the year’s first surprise. While US-bound rates crashed, Europe-bound trades stabilised and even rose, earning the label of the year’s “odd duckling”. 

July to August, early Q3: Divergence, then disbelief 

By mid-summer, the market had fractured. 

  • The transpacific entered a deep slide as front-loaded demand evaporated and overcapacity became entrenched; 
  • Asia–Europe initially held up, supported by congestion, blank sailings, and comparatively stable demand; 
  • The transatlantic remained flat but fragile. 

What puzzled the market was that Asia-Europe rates began to fall sharply despite evidence that capacity was effectively short, with services were under-staffed, vessels missing, and networks stretched. 

This contradiction marked a turning point: competition, not capacity maths, was now driving pricing. Daily discounting became common, and confidence in carrier discipline eroded. 

September to October, late Q3 to early Q4: The rate war and the reset attempt 

By early autumn, the Asia-Europe trade slid into an unmistakable rate war. Spot rates fell week after week, even as demand remained healthy and Red Sea diversions continued. 

Carriers responded with increasingly aggressive tactics: 

  • Large, headline GRIs; 
  • ‘Shock-and-awe’ FAK announcements; 
  • Golden Week blank sailings; 
  • Appeals to congestion, geopolitics and disruption. 

These efforts produced only brief, fragile rebounds. The market absorbed each hike and then slipped again, reinforcing the sense that gravity was winning. 

At the same time, the transatlantic finally cracked, as capacity injections collided with soft demand, pushing utilisation to dangerously low levels and dragging rates toward historical lows. 

November to December, Q4: Tender-season engineering and an uneven finish 

The final phase of the year was dominated by contract-season positioning. Carriers coordinated successive rounds of FAK increases on Asia-Europe, backed by tighter capacity and selective blanking, to create higher reference points ahead of 2026 tenders. 

This time, the strategy had partial success. Asia-Europe spot rates climbed steadily through November and December, supported by a pre-Chinese New Year mini-peak and firmer capacity management. Rates recovered meaningfully, though still far below year-earlier levels. 

Elsewhere, the picture was bleak: 

  • The transpacific failed to hold repeated GRIs as demand stayed weak and discounting returned almost immediately; 
  • The transatlantic sank into structural distress, with carriers forced to acknowledge that capacity withdrawals were unavoidable. 

The year closed with rates higher than their autumn lows, but with no illusion of a true recovery, just a manufactured floor ahead of a difficult 2026. 

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