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© Maksym Yemelyanov

President Trump was busy at the weekend, issuing a trio of trade-related orders that show how aggressively the White House is now using tariffs as instruments of foreign policy rather than trade management. 

Perhaps the most significant is the executive order on Iran, which creates a framework for imposing punitive US tariffs on any country that trades with Tehran. 

Under the order, the US may levy additional tariffs – it used 25% as an example –- on imports from any foreign country found to be directly or indirectly purchasing Iranian goods or services. Crucially, this is not limited to oil, nor to direct transactions. Goods or services routed through intermediaries or third countries may still qualify if their Iranian origin can be “reasonably traced”. 

The process leaves significant discretion in the hands of the US administration. The Department of Commerce determines whether a country is trading with Iran; the State Department then recommends whether tariffs should be imposed and at what level; the president retains final authority. Tariffs can be imposed, increased, suspended, or reimposed at any time. 

From a trade perspective, the implications are profound, as it effectively globalises US Iran sanctions by tying access to the US market to third-country compliance with US foreign policy. 

Countries potentially exposed include: China, Iran’s largest oil customer; Turkey, a long-standing energy and logistics partner; and the United Arab Emirates, particularly Dubai’s re-export and financial hub. India remains exposed given its historical energy ties with Iran, while Pakistan and parts of Central Asia maintain economically significant trade links.

South-east Asian transhipment hubs, including Malaysia and Singapore, may also face heightened scrutiny where petrochemicals, shipping services, or blended products may obscure Iranian origin. 

Beyond states, the order creates risk for shipping companies, insurers, traders, and banks whose activities may “indirectly” involve Iranian goods or services, a term defined broadly and deliberately left open to interpretation. 

Next up is the executive order removing a 25% tariff surcharge on Indian goods, imposed just six months earlier, after the US determined that India was continuing to import Russian oil. The tariff applied broadly across Indian exports, making it one of the most far-reaching trade penalties the US has imposed on a major partner in recent years. 

The new order rescinds that surcharge, effective 7 February, after the administration concluded that India had committed to stop directly or indirectly importing Russian oil, agreed to purchase US energy products, and entered into a 10-year framework to expand defence cooperation with Washington. 

Last up is a presidential proclamation temporarily expanding the US beef import tariff-rate quota (TRQ). 

Citing drought, wildfires, disease-related import restrictions on Mexican cattle, and record-low US herd numbers, the administration authorised an additional 80,000 tonnes of lean beef trimmings to enter the US market in 2026 at the lower, in-quota tariff rate. 

The quota increase is split into four quarterly tranches and is allocated entirely to Argentina – a bid to ease price pressures for US consumers. 

 Catch up with today’s News in Brief podcast!

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